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In fracturing the imperial bond and rejecting the sovereignty of the King in Parliament, the 
patriots of 1776, and after 1783 Americans, embarked upon a remarkable conversation 
concerning the form of the state, the nature of governance, and the character of republican 
citizenship. Central to this process, but lacking in sustained focus, was the contentious issue 
of the role of coercion requisite to sustain the revolutionary process and respect the virtuous 
character of a free people. This article argues that the experience of building a state, with 
particular focus on the Commonwealth of Virginia, ensured that the framers eventually 
became reconciled to the paradoxes of coercion in securing the safety of the new nation.  
 

























In his essay, Federalist No. 20, on the historical precedents of confederal government, James 
Madison drew the conclusion that it would be “subversive of the order and ends of civil 
polity” were the “destructive coercion of the sword,” to be substituted in the “place of the 
mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy.”1 The alarming prospect of physical violence 
that would doubtless ensue between the states in an ill-regulated confederation was, therefore, 
an important reason to endorse the proposed Constitution in which the powers of government 
would be properly regulated and coercion would be both “mild and salutary”. Madison, along 
with many other political thinkers and leaders of the Revolution, Alexander Hamilton 
excepted, was consistent in his desire to constrain the coercive powers of the state, but he was 
equally desirous to ensure that the state should be endowed with those coercive powers. 
However, as the dichotomy between the coercion of violence and of the law revealed, the 
question of what type of coercion would be suitable in a republic was to prove a complex 
one. 
 The Founders’ debates over what constituted the acceptable nature and extent of 
coercion helped to inspire, and then to inform, the unfolding drama of revolutionary state 
formation that transformed the Thirteen British North American Colonies into the fledgling 
United States of America. The project of state formation initiated by the collapse of the 
colonial regime across the thirteen British North American colonies and extending through to 
the implementation of the Constitution of the United States of America constituted one of the 
most intense and sustained efforts to remake government in the early modern Atlantic 
World.2 Throughout this period the colonists, later United States’ citizens, were forced to 
                                                          
1 James Madison, with Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist Paper No. 20,” in The Federalist, ed. 
Terence Ball (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 93. Italics in the original. This 
distinction had previously been made by Alexander Hamilton in “Federalist Paper No. 15”, 
68. 
2 On the construction of the revolutionary state the classic statement remains Gordon S. 
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969; repr., Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History 
and Culture, 2008); essential for understanding the Framers’ ambitions for the federal 
Constitution is Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Making of the American State (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003). Further approaches identified by: Jack P. Greene, “State Formation, Resistance, and 
the Creation of Revolutionary Traditions in the Early Modern Era”, in Creating the British 
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confront, time and again, the most fundamental questions pertaining to the nature of 
governance and the relationship between state and citizen. A critical, yet often overlooked, 
component of these debates was the issue of coercion. The term itself had a precise enough 
definition relating to restraint by force or threat, but its location as a concept within the 
political thought on government was much more complex.3 Within an era marked by 
profound conceptual change, in which the terms of political language were tempered under 
the great pressure of debate, coercion was not a term that sustained explicit scrutiny on its 
own terms. In part, the relative obscurity of coercion as a central tenet of the debate 
surrounding state formation stemmed from the multivalent language of the “monopoly of 
legitimate physical violence” endowed to the state, including force, power, sovereignty, and 
authority.4 Although separate and precise, these concepts were inevitably intertwined in the 
discussions surrounding the creation of the revolutionary republican state; a delineation that 
continues in the historiography.5 
 Coercion, understood politically, was primarily an expression of the authority of the 
state to compel obedience to the laws of the commonwealth. Following Thomas Hobbes, 
whose Leviathan of 1651 was a masterwork on the form of the early modern state, the role of 
coercion is made clear: “For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe 
                                                          
Atlantic: Essays on Transplantation, Adaptation, and Continuity (Charlottesville: University 
of Virginia Press, 2013), 34-63; Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and 
the Creation of the American Union, 1774-1804 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2009); and Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution 
(New York: Hill & Wang, 2007). Michael J. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of 
the United States Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) is another foray 
into long-running debate of the Framers’ intentions. 
3 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed. (London: W. Strahan, 
1755), 1:400.  
4 Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” in eds. Peter Lassman and Ronald 
Spiers Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 310-11. A 
significant influence on the approach to interpreting political concepts in this article derives 
from the essays in Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock, eds. Conceptual Changes and the 
Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988). 
5 For instance, the dual entry for “coercive power/government of force” in the index of 
Edling’s Revolution in Favor of Government, 317. 
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after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, ambitions, avarice, 
anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some coërcive Power”.6 Coercion, in this 
abstract formulation, was therefore an expression of the power that the state could threaten, 
and if necessary wield, to ensure that government was maintained. Thus, coercion expressed 
a particular aspect of the vocabulary of political force and violence. Beyond this political 
realm, coercion described any form of force of compulsion, and could and did encompass a 
whole host of coercive relationships that existed within the early modern Atlantic World. 
These social relations, such as that of master and slave or servant, or family patriarch and 
dependents, were enforced by law and custom and to some extent replicated the political 
commonwealth of the state. However, in the ideological ferment of revolution, the elites who 
challenged the role of coercion in the state proved unwilling to see it challenged within their 
own little commonwealths.   
The term coercion was elided to a degree in the founding debates because of its 
negative connotations with the seemingly unwarranted compulsion that marked Parliament’s 
endeavors to punish the recalcitrant colonists. Liberty was the watchword for the patriots and 
in the febrile atmosphere in which they feared they were being enslaved coercion was too 
easily associated with tyranny and slavery. The Loyalist Jonathan Boucher tellingly 
reclaimed the opprobrious term from Patriot dismay over the Coercive Acts and applied it to 
his own treatment, writing that “everything that savours of, or but approaches to, coercion or 
compulsion is persecution and tyranny.”7 A republican society did not imply the wholesale 
rejection of coercive force; indeed coercive actions could be extensive and extreme, ranging 
as they did from the economic coercion of non-importation of British goods to violence 
directed against enemies of the Revolution, actions characterized as “self-defense”. However, 
                                                          
6 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. Richard Tuck, revised student ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 96. 
7 “To George Washington from Jonathan Boucher, 6 August 1775,” Founders Online, 
National Archives, last modified June 13, 2018, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-01-02-0164. [Original source: The 
Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 1, 16 June 1775 – 15 




this was not coercion against virtuous citizens.8 In practice, moreover, the potential 
legitimacy that the British state may have had to apply coercive measures was, by the eve of 
the Revolution, irredeemably undermined by the rejection of British sovereignty. Yet for all 
of these problems with the term, coercion could not be discarded from the technical 
vocabulary of eighteenth-century governance and was therefore essential to the process of 
state making whether or not the patriots or framers wished to use the word explicitly. 
Coercion was something of a paradox that required at least some attempt to reconcile the 
need to guarantee liberty alongside the protection of state, citizen, and property.9 
Reconciling and rehabilitating coercion into the conception of the republican state was 
therefore a process undertaken by a faction of the political elite who felt their grip on the 
levers of power undermined by the democratic tendencies that emerged from the Revolution. 
These were men acclimatized to exercising control both within the public and private spheres 
of their lives. Yet whilst these pragmatic motivations remain crucial for understanding the 
outcome of the framers’ actions, the legacy of their abstract, often arcane, discussions of 
coercion had equally profound consequences for the future treatment of the inhabitants of 
North America, and for the resilience of the state in the face of threat. By establishing the 
form of government afresh, wholly according to the best theories of political thought of the 
era, the framers were able to delineate the coercive character of the state in a manner that was 
to prove decisive to the future stability of the state. 
 
                                                          
8 Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of 
Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 251-253, 273-4. 
As Maier notes, legal-minded Patriots were alarmed with the implications of mob violence. 
9 E. A. Goerner and Walter J. Thompson phrase it thus, “the liberal state is a paradox: a 
coercive public order to guarantee individualistic liberty,” in “Politics and Coercion”, 
Political Theory 24, no. 4 (1996), 620. There has been a growing interest in the question of 
violence and coercion in the historiography of the American Revolution and also of the US 
state: Gary Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the 
Founding to the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). A recent PhD thesis, 
discovered too late for the arguments to inform this piece, is Aaron Tristan Knapp, “Law’s 
Revolutions: Coercion and Constitutional Change in the American Founding.” PhD diss., 
Boston University, 2016. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/14538. 
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Virginia’s journey from colony to independence as a sovereign state, and the critical role 
played by Virginians in the design and debate over the federal Constitution, exemplified the 
complex transition of the place of coercion in the ideology of state formation. Although 
sharing many of the characteristics of the common cause of the other colonies, the 
combination of republican rhetoric, revolutionary ideology, social conflict, and the existence 
of large enslaved population created a specific context in which the tensions of coercion were 
examined with particular scrutiny. Virginia was to exhibit most acutely some of the great 
ironies of the Revolution, which were both part of, and to some extent mirrored, the 
dilemmas of a coercive state. Beginning with the initial resistance to what was considered the 
intolerable coercion of the British Empire, Virginian Patriots constructed a stoic imagery of 
republican virtue to contrast with the corrupting influences emanating from Parliament. The 
idealistic expectations were possibly unreachable, for as Arthur Lee confessed, “the fears, I 
have long entertained, that there was not virtue enough in America to sustain her liberties, 
overwhelm me now with affliction.”10 However, as continued resistance gradually dismantled 
the sinews of the colonial regime, and the necessity arose of replacing the framework of 
government with a new constitution, confidence was regained. As one commentator wrote, 
conditions in the commonwealth were propitious to erect the “best republicks, upon the best 
terms that ever came to the lot of any people before us.”11  
 For the Patriots the connection between virtue and liberty stood in stark contrast to the 
corrupt tyranny stretching out from Whitehall to strangle freedom. The peril of the situation, 
in part exaggerated by metaphor, but real enough in the form of British military resources, 
served to differentiate the intolerable coercion attempted by the failing colonial regime and 
the self-preserving persuasion and vigilance of unified resistance. The emerging 
revolutionary regime, evolving from extra-legal committees to autonomous government, was 
full willing to exercise coercive powers against the perceived enemies of liberty, but careful 
justification was required. However, as Peter Thompson has recently suggested, the 
hardening position of the patriot proto-government against colonists lukewarm or hostile to 
                                                          
10 Arthur Lee to Theodorick Bland, London, 21 August 1770 in ed. Charles Campbell, The 
Bland Papers (Petersburg: Edmund & Julian Ruffin, 1840) 1:28. Significance of virtue 
discussed in Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 65-70; J. G. A. Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
11 E. F. Virginia Gazette (Purdie), May 17, 1776, 2. 
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the resistance movement absorbed the ideological foundations of the punishment of chattel 
slavery into the armory of coercive control.12 Thus the paradigm of a state differentiating 
between virtuous citizens and an unruly – and therefore to be ruled – enemy was further 
incorporated into the strategy of the nascent republican state. When, in November 1775, the 
Virginia governor, Lord Dunmore, attempted to recruit slaves to bolster the imperial regime 
this logic of slavery and revolution – that Britain was attempting to enslave and that 
resistance must succeed – was only reinforced.13 
Once independence was firmly accepted, establishing a republican state to support 
defensive measures became an urgent necessity. Carter Braxton urged the Virginia 
Convention “to assume the reins of government, and no longer suffer the people to live 
without the benefit of law”, or the ongoing uncertainty would lead to “[a]narchy and riot” and 
would therefore “render the enjoyment of our liberties and future quiet, at least very 
precarious.”14 In a similar, if less alarmist, vein, Richard Henry Lee wrote to Edmund 
Pendleton of his hopes for the progress being made by the Virginia Convention on this task, 
noting that “a wise and free government, without which, neither publick or private happiness 
                                                          
12 Peter Thompson, “Social Death and Slavery: The Logic of Political Association and the 
Logic of Chattel Slavery in Revolutionary America”, in eds. Patrick Griffin, Robert G. 
Ingram, Peter S. Onuf, and Brian Schoen, Between Sovereignty and Anarchy: The Politics of 
Violence in the American Revolutionary Era (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2015), 139-164. 
13 Philip D. Morgan and Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, “Arming Slaves in the American 
Revolution,” in eds. Christopher Leslie Brown and Philip D. Morgan, Arming Slaves: From 
Classical Times to the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 189. The 
exclusionary nature of racial discourse during the Revolution is compellingly revealed in 
Robert G. Parkinson, The Common Cause 
14 Carter Braxton, An Address to the Convention and Ancient Dominion of Virginia (1776), in 
eds. Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, The Founders’ Constitution (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1987); online ed. http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s10.html. For discussion of this political 
metaphor in the Confederation period see: Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins 
of the Constitution (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), 5.  
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or security can long be expected.”15 For Lee, along with other republicans, the key to security 
was the imposition of constraints upon governmental power and prerogative. Prefaced by its 
Bill of Rights, the republican constitution of Virginia certainly introduced and clarified 
considerable protection for the liberty of the citizen. The first three sections stipulated the 
principles upon which the new government would be conceived, emphasizing the belief in 
popular sovereignty. The third section, designed to incorporate a Lockean notion of just 
resistance, began with a brief overview of the purpose of government: “that government is, or 
ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, 
or community: that is best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and 
safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of maladministration.”16 However, 
for all of the emphasis on protecting the individual, the function of government to protect the 
people, and by extension the revolutionary state, required and received much more specific 
coercive powers. In addition to establishing the state constitution, the convention delegates 
issued an ordinance “to enable the present magistrates and officers to continue the 
administration of justice, and for settling the general mode of proceedings in criminal and 
other cases, till the same can be more amply provided for.” That there would be more ample 
provision was expressly addressed in the preamble: “it will require some considerable time to 
compile a body of laws suited to the circumstances of the country, and it is necessary to 
provide some method of preserving peace and security to the community in the meantime.” 17 
Perhaps inevitably, this required a continuation of the existing laws derived from the English 
Parliament and Virginia General Assembly.  
                                                          
15 Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Pendleton, 12 May 1776, in eds. Paul H. Smith, et. al., 
Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1976-
2000), 3:667, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(dg003615)). 
16 The Constitution of Virginia – 1776, in ed. Francis Newton Thorpe, The Federal and State 
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and 
Colonies now or heretofore forming the United States of America (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1909), 7:3812. 
17 Ordinances passed at a General Convention of Delegates and Representatives from the 
several counties and corporations of Virginia (1776) (Richmond: Ritchie, Truehart & Du-
Val, 1816), 9-10. 
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As Gwenda Morgan notes, it was not the ideology of the Revolution itself which 
begat legal reform along the lines of Enlightenment discourse, but nevertheless the 
opportunity to review the legal code was seized with some enthusiasm by the reform-
minded.18 In keeping with the broader opportunity to rid the framework of government of its 
problematic inheritances from Britain in the writing of the new constitution was the chance to 
revise the laws with a similar intent; most notably with establishment of a committee tasked 
with this purpose, principally comprising of Thomas Jefferson, George Mason, and Edmund 
Pendleton. That the fundamental principles of these tasks were, within the strict limits of 
existing racial and gender hierarchies, liberal, did not obviate the reassertion of legitimate 
force where required. In a written exchange between Pendleton and Jefferson, prior to their 
collaboration as committeemen, the challenge of reconciling the apparatus of the state against 
criminal activity was canvassed. Pendleton, hearing rumors of Jefferson’s over-enthusiasm, 
acknowledged that the law had “hitherto been too Sanguinary, punishing too many crimes 
with death,” and was willing to see it “changed for some other mode of Punishment in most 
cases.” In his response, Jefferson repudiated the allegations that his intention was to do away 
with penalties and rely on virtue alone, clarifying that: 
It is only the sanguinary hue of our penal laws which I meant to object to. 
Punishments I know are necessary, and I would provide them, strict and inflexible, 
but proportioned to the crime. Death might be inflicted for murther and perhaps for 
treason if you would take out of the description of treason all crimes which are not 
such in their nature. Rape, buggery &c. punish by castration.19 
Jefferson’s proposals for a graduated scale of punishments revealed an enthusiasm for 
theoretical neatness rather blind to its barbarous implications. 
 Although the proposed bill “for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases 
Heretofore Capital” was never enacted, it represented something of the tensions inherent 
within the developing republican state toward the degree of violence that could be sanctioned 
                                                          
18 Gwenda Morgan, “‘One of the first fruits of liberty:’ penal reform in the young Republic”, 
in ed. R. A. Burchell, The End of Anglo-America: Historical Essays in the study of Cultural 
Divergence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 87. 
19 Jefferson to Pendleton, Philadelphia, 26 August 1776, ibid, 503-506. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Jefferson was later to distance himself from this crude example of the lex 
talionis, Jefferson, Autobiography, in ed. Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings 
(New York: Library of America, 1984), 38. 
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for the state to wield.20  This instance was not an explicit discussion of coercion, and was, 
moreover, confined to the punishment of crimes against “lives, liberties and property of 
others”, that is of individual citizens and not the state. Nevertheless, as Pendleton had 
conceded and other enthusiasts for reform had argued, the inherited regime of capital 
punishment was unsuitable for an enlightened republic.21 Reformulating the state’s 
representation and deployment of force, at least in the case of criminal endeavors, 
demonstrated a desire to constrain and codify the coercive apparatus. However, even the 
architect of the plan, Jefferson, was not blindly optimistic in the ability of human nature to 
have the quantum of virtue necessary to sustain the peace of the land unaided.22 Rather, the 
apportioned severity of the proposed sentences testified to the rigor with which the republican 
state could punish criminal acts. Within the broader revision of the laws that Jefferson was 
engaged with, albeit with a completely different intellectual context, Jefferson vehemently 
rejected the authority of the state to coerce the mind. In the famous preamble to the Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom, which premised that “Almighty God hath created the mind 
free,” Jefferson explained that “the holy author of our religion … chose not to propagate it by 
coercions” on either the mind or the body.23 Jefferson may have advanced more rapidly 
toward reform than many of his fellow Virginians were willing to countenance, but the 
episode of the committee of revisors revealed the desire to clarify and strengthen the 
                                                          
20 “64. A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital, 18 
June 1779,” Founders Online, National Archives, last modified April 12, 2018, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0064. [Original 
source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, 1777 – 18 June 1779, ed. Julian P. Boyd. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, pp. 492–507.] 
21 Steven Wilf, Law’s Imagined Republic: Popular Politics and Criminal Justice in 
Revolutionary America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10. 
22 Maurizio Valsania, The Limits of Optimism: Thomas Jefferson’s Dualistic Enlightenment 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), esp. 78-84. Valsania further discusses 
Jefferson’s latterly-expressed willingness to supersede the law in exceptional circumstances: 
149-151. 
23 “82. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 18 June 1779,” Founders Online, National 
Archives, last modified April 12, 2018, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-
02-02-0132-0004-0082. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, 1777 – 18 
June 1779, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, pp. 545–553.] 
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authority of the fledgling state in a manner conformable to its republican character. This was 
a state in which the limits on coercion to enhance the liberty of individuals fully justified the 
effective deployment of force against those who were deemed to threaten the state. 
 As the theoretical limits of the state’s coercive authority over its citizens were 
debated, and the contrasts with the arbitrary colonial form were drawn, the revolutionary state 
continued to rely on the traditional, nearly unremarked, domestic coercive authority inherent 
in the overlapping patriarchal authority of the early modern household and chattel slavery.24 
That Virginia’s slaveholding political elite had, as Alan Taylor wryly describes, “a very weak 
sense of irony,” when it came to their rhetoric over British attempts to enslave them, and their 
own ownership of human chattel has long been discussed as a matter of paradox or 
hypocrisy.25 The relationship of slavery to the republican state demonstrated one of the most 
significant coercive mechanisms available to legislators: the deliberate exclusion of a person, 
or group of people, from legal protection. The “Bill concerning Slaves” drafted by the 
committee repeatedly defined in its different sections the conditions under which the persons 
specified would be “out of the protection of the laws.” Existing prohibitions on slave 
testimony in courts against citizens, against travelling in groups, nor without permission were 
maintained. Corporal punishment (‘with stripes’) decreed by a Justice of the Peace was 
prescribed for such infractions.26 
Virginia had inherited the interconnected hierarchies of coercive control which had 
long been a hallmark of the evolving system of the early modern Atlantic world. As Douglas 
Hay demonstrates, the severity of eighteenth-century English criminal law was implemented 
with the purpose of reinforcing the social order as well as punishing malefactors.27 The 
severity of capital punishment or transportation meted-out to fellow subjects was part of a 
                                                          
24 Kathleen M. Brown, Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, 
and Power in Colonial Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the 
Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1996), 15-19, 319-324. 
25 Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772-1832 (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 2013), 14. 
26 “A Bill concerning Slaves” in Report of the Committee of Revisors appointed by the 
General Assembly in Virginia (Richmond: Dixon and Holt, [1784]), 40.  
27 Douglas Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’, in eds. Douglas Hay, Peter 
Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow, Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime 
and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 24-25. 
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spectrum of state sanctioned violence that extended to the unlimited coercion of the 
Caribbean plantation regime or that used against Native Americans in war. That the spectrum 
was fractured by the Somerset decision in 1772 merely reinforced the fissures of coercion 
that were inherent within empire. The recourse of the revolutionary republican state to these 
separate traditions of coercive authority was therefore merely a continuation of existing 
practice and ideology, albeit with some amendment. It was the inner pragmatism that ensured 
the continued functioning of a state whose wellspring was supposedly the virtue of the 
people, but which refused to extend its privileges to any who were not assuredly loyal.  
State formation in Virginia may have permitted the implementation of long-held 
theoretical principles of governance, but the context of resistance and revolutionary war 
inevitably conditioned interpretations of the nature and legitimacy of force. Coercion was 
required to sustain the Revolution, an additional burden to the state’s traditional purpose to 
maintain the acceptable bonds of society. Consequently, it was entirely coherent to their 
political ideology for staunch advocates for liberty, of whom some were to become leading 
Antifederalists, to voice strong opinions on the necessity of effecting coercive measures. The 
legitimization of this behavior was couched in the fundamental purposes of government and 
the zeal for advancing the cause of liberty and protecting property. One of the greatest 
challenges for revolutionary state, at least for the early part of the war, concerned the raising 
of troops to serve in the Continental Army. The trials of waging an extended war quickly 
tested the virtuous spirit of voluntarism on two connected fronts: recruiting men and raising 
taxes. As the struggle continued, the necessity of a more coercive approach became clear.  
Military power and discipline were the ultimate resource of the state and consequently 
set apart from the accepted privileges of civilian government; much to the disgust and fear of 
English radical writers and American patriots.28 However, the theoretical objection was to 
being “govern’d by Armies” and “Military Government,” and to the failure to reduce the 
army to the “usual Guards and Garrisons” once immediate danger had passed.29 The practical 
experience of eighteenth-century warfare both at home and abroad produced a greater legal 
focus on the extent and prerogatives of military power, notably Stephen Adye’s 1769 A 
                                                          
28 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, enlarged ed. 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), 62-63. [R3: 
Military Coercion Historiography – huge] 




Treatise on Courts Martial, dedicated to the Commander in Chief in North America, Thomas 
Gage. The rigors of military discipline, “so plainly shewn by the Articles of War, which 
every military Man is, or ought to be fully acquainted with,” were a separate and long-
established code, the necessity of war and acts of Parliament justifying its severity.30 It was 
within this mixed intellectual heritage that Virginia’s legislators sought to embody their 
fellow citizens to defend their liberties. As with the protection of property, social class 
divisions went some way to explaining practices which would be uncomfortable, if not 
intolerable, for the politically enfranchised. Thus, Michael McDonnell identifies the 
continuity between the practices of the colonial regime, in which “provincial elites raised 
soldiers by coercing and exploiting the lowest classes of whites,” and that of the 
revolutionary state.31 
Virginia’s failure to raise troops for the Continental Army reflected the increasing 
strains of waging a revolutionary war; with the somewhat incompatible competition between 
the desire to maintain the Commonwealth’s militia, and those who expressed exasperation 
against the “lazy, worthless young men” who were not volunteering.32 Implementing a draft 
in 1777 to combat continued shortfalls demonstrated how far the urgency of defense against 
British forces, or internal enemies, had eroded faith in the inherent virtue of the people. 
Volunteering was to be encouraged by bounties in order to make conscription more palatable, 
                                                          
30 Stephen Payne Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial (New York: H. Gaine, 1769), 6; 
Blackstone covers the nature of military discipline and its support by Parliament, William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1979), 1:399-402. The significance of a separate sense of military law is also discussed by 
Edling, Revolution in Favor, 82. 
31 Michael A. McDonnell, “‘Fit For Common Service?’ Class, Race, and Recruitment in 
Revolutionary Virginia”, in eds. John Resch and Walter Sargent, War and Society in the 
American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts, (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 2007), 105. McDonnell’s broader examination of the social conflict exacerbated by 
wartime conditions in his The Politics of War: Race, Class, and Conflict in Revolutionary 
Virginia (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and 
Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2007). 
32 Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson, 29 April 1777, cited in Jeff Broadwater, George 
Mason: Forgotten Founder (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 112; 
Mason’s views, 73. 
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but there was also an undercurrent of threat. The apprehension of certain classes of deserter 
would reduce by a straight swap of man for man the quota from that county. The provision 
concluded, “all deserters heretofore or hereafter enlisted or draughted in this commonwealth, 
and not otherwise punished by martial law, shall be compelled to serve double the time of 
their absence from duty.” Military government by the British was still abominated, but 
martial law was the accepted law for military personnel. Under the growing pressure of the 
approaching British invasion in late 1780-1781 the discord of the draft increased resistance 
from an individual to a collective level. In extremis, with British troops undermining the 
operation of government, the line between martial law and military government became 
blurred. George Mason complained of draft resistance in the lower counties: “if such 
dangerous Mutinies are not affectually quelled, & the Ring-leaders punished, our 
Government can’t subsist. IF the Civil Power of the Countys where they have happened is 
insufficient, I hope the military Force, lately raised, will afford Means of doing it.”33 
The creation of the Virginian state in time of revolution and war revealed both the 
idealism of the republican vision of governance and the pragmatism of authority. Although 
weakened by internal tumults and exterior threats, elite Virginians of different political 
persuasions were, at least, inheritors of an intellectual tradition which located legitimate 
coercion as an essential of state sovereignty. Within the state there was debate about its form, 
extent, and acceptability, but not its necessity. However, the Commonwealth of Virginia was 
not a state alone, but a state confederated within the United States of America under the 
Articles of Confederation. It was in this relationship that the blurring of sovereignty produced 
new discussions over the acceptable nature of coercion for the common good. Once again, 
but in a different framework, the question of compulsion in the name of the people would 
raise significant debate and challenging answers.34 
 
Mirroring the process of republican state formation within each state was the protracted and 
controversial process to establish a form of government between the states under the Articles 
                                                          
33 William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the Laws of 
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of Confederation and then the Constitution. Whereas the composition of sovereignty within 
an existing polity was relatively clear-cut, the question of how it was to be shared between 
the sovereign states acting in concert was to prove significantly more challenging to 
determine. The problem of the coercive powers that could be accorded to this form of state 
was therefore the subject of much more explicit scrutiny and debate than had been required 
by the relatively straightforward transformation from monarchy to republic. Yet, for all the 
differences between these two different expressions of state formation, the purpose and 
means by which the state was to be endowed with coercive authority were couched in the 
same language of social contract and good governance. These ideals were, from the inception 
of national politics, a counter to the factionalism and frustrations of regional jealousy over 
tactics and resources. The protracted struggle to ratify the Articles of Confederation were set 
in sharp relief by the ongoing hardships of war. One correspondent of Thomas Jefferson 
lamented the impasse and opined that ratification would “give force and energy to the 
proceedings of congress”.35 However, when the Articles came into effect on 1 March 1781 
their limitations provided no panacea and early attempts to amend sought to remedy the most 
glaring defects. Under the increasing threat to Virginia posed by the advance of Cornwallis’s 
army the perceived failure of Congress to provide sufficient support prompted an exasperated 
Theoderick Bland to spell-out the principles at stake: “all things will go well-could the states 
be prevailed on to throw into the hands of Congress a few of those soverign powers, which 
are (in the hands of the individual States) totally inefficient to work the general weal-as the 
powers of no one state can be competent or coextensive to the wants of the whole.”36 
Bland’s diagnosis of the fundamental problems was both acute and succinct, at least in 
comparison to the constitutional prose which had been drafted to achieve this very purpose. 
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 The first movement to strengthen the Articles upon their ratification was the report of 
a committee, comprising James Mitchell Varnum, James Duane, and James Madison, 
charged with preparing a “plan to invest the United States in Congress assembled with full 
and explicit power for effectually carrying into execution in the several states all acts or 
resolutions passed agreeably to the Articles of Confederation.”37 The report, in James 
Madison’s handwriting, sought to make explicit the provision for enforcing the resolutions of 
Congress under the Articles. It was “most consonant to the spirit of a free constitution that on 
the one hand all exercise of power should be explicitly and precisely warranted, and on the 
other that the penal consequences of a violation of duty should be clearly promulgated and 
understood”. To that end, a further clause was proposed for addition to the Articles 
authorizing the use of federal force “to compel such State or States to fulfill their federal 
engagements”.38 The proposal was swiftly drowned in procedural procrastination: the report 
was turned-over to a new committee for further deliberation, which delivered another report, 
which was, in turn, referred to a new committee (this one consisting of Edmund Randolph, 
Oliver Ellsworth, and Varnum), who drafted a further report for the 22 August 1781, which 
was then shelved.39 
 Whilst the short-term failure to initiate reform, especially against the backdrop of war, 
was a harbinger of the structural paralysis that so alarmed the Articles’ nationalist critics, 
Madison’s involvement in drafting the first report also provided a glimpse of the struggle to 
frame coercive authority in an acceptable manner. Madison’s first draft of the amendment 
included the use of the word “coercive” in relation to the authority and power that Congress 
lacked and ought to have: “And Whereas the want of such provision may be made a pretext 
by delinquent States against whom coercive measures which may be necessary for preserving 
the authority of the Confederation & for doing justice to the States which shall duly fulfill 
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their foederal engagements”. Whether it was Madison or James Duane who was unhappy 
with the style, or with the content, the final draft excised the charge against delinquent states 
and the concomitant threat of coercive measures. Instead, the lines were amended to suggest 
the debatable legitimacy that might arise from the lack of explicit clarity pertaining to the 
precise powers granted to Congress.40 Madison was much more forthright in his letter to 
Jefferson on the subject of the report and on the “necessity of arming Congress with coercive 
powers”; in private the sensibilities of the smaller states’ amour propre could be ignored.41 
The nature and degree of aversion to coercion displayed in this instance is debatable, a slim 
foundation on which to build a case, but it does stand as a contrast to the much more open 
avowal of the term in the subsequent process of drafting and ratifying the Constitution. 
 The continuity of the concerns from these first failed attempts at amendment to the 
proposals for extra-Congressional reforms to the Articles reflected the growing fears that 
post-revolutionary government was unvirtuous, unstable, and increasingly unworkable. 
Virginian critics of this state of affairs maintained, in keeping with Madison’s earlier 
analysis, that the lack of coercion was integral to the problems faced by the fledgling 
republic. As George Washington confided to James Madison, he had “doubts whether any 
system without the means of coercion in the Sovereign, will enforce obedience to the 
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Ordinances of a Genl Government.”42 Madison had even fewer doubts, explicitly linking the 
lack of coercive sanctions as one of the vices prevailing in the existing system of 
confederation government: “A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is that of 
Government. The federal system being destitute of both, wants the great vital principles of a 
Political Cons[ti]tution.”43 A reliance on virtue alone was insufficient for the state when 
treating with citizens, the same lesson would need to be applied to the states themselves. The 
form and application of coercive measures in a constitutional relationship did not, however, 
have the same foundations as that of the criminal law or wartime emergency to justify. 
Having expressed his doubts on a system without coercion, Washington proved wary of 
expressing a simple solution: “But the kind of coercion you may ask? – This indeed will 
require thought.”44 Within the privacy of the convention the answer to Washington’s question 
was to be gradually unfolded in the debates and decisions that wrought the form of the 
Constitution.  
 The convocation in Philadelphia of fifty-five statesmen met at the behest of Congress 
to suggest “alterations” that, if approved, would “render the federal Constitution adequate to 
the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union” laid the foundations for a 
new form of federal government that was much more explicitly endowed with coercive 
authority.45 That the remedy developed and proposed over the summer of 1787 was a 
fundamental reconceptualization of the relationship between state and citizen; contained 
innovations and compromises that propelled the political development of the new nation; and 
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remains the operative Constitution of the United States to the present day has ensured that the 
meaning and events of the convention continue to receive intensive scrutiny. To address the 
requirement proposed by Congress to the meet exigencies and to preserve the Union was, 
inevitably, to confront the question of the coercive powers appropriate for a state to assume. 
 Although the lack of coercive power had been explicitly identified as a weakness of 
the Articles prior to the convention, it was not a term that was readily adopted or deployed by 
the delegates, at least according to the various written memoranda of debates. As with 
previous usages in the language of state formation, coercion was an essential, but 
nevertheless a principle to be incorporated in relative silence. Consequently, the coercive 
strain of what was to become the Federal state was imbrued through the many different 
debates pertaining to sovereignty, representation, slavery, and the more explicitly enumerated 
powers accorded to the Congress. 
 Launching the first statement of what the new federal government ought to 
encompass, Edmund Randolph’s speech introducing the Virginia Plan identified that the 
“character of such a governme[nt] ought to secure 1. Against foreign invasion: 2. Against 
dissentions between members of the Union, or seditions in particular states: … 4. To be able 
to defend itself against incroachment: & 5. To be paramount to the state consistutions.”46 
Regardless of the specific proposals that comprised the Virginia Plan, Randolph’s character 
sketch identified the coercive attributes of statehood.47 Further discussion on the plan 
explored the meaning of this radically different vision of a “national” or “supreme” frame of 
government, which was to have “a compleat and compulsive operation.”48 George Mason 
then elaborated the distinction between a confederation that was “deficient in not providing 
for coercion & punishment agst. delinquent States” and the type of government that was 
required which “could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those only whose 
guilt required it.”49 Differentiating between the use of coercion against a political entity and 
the punishment of individual criminals was to prove a crucial justification for the shift in the 
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locus of sovereignty; it was also useful in relegating coercion beneath the more acceptable 
language of crime and punishment.50 
 Concomitant to the reformulation of sovereignty into a national legislature was the 
argument that it should have a negative over state laws which might infringe on the former’s 
prerogatives. In keeping with preceding justifications, the proposed clause was framed as a 
means to dampen friction and remove the need to deploy force. For Madison, the “negative 
was the mildest expedient that could be devised” and a much more practical remedy than “an 
appeal to coercion.”51 This was a continuation of his previously voiced concern that the use 
of force against an individual state could give the “party attacked” license to believe the 
compact of union dissolved.52 Opposing the proposed negative on principle, Gunning 
Bedford rejected the danger posed to smaller states by larger and suggested that whether or 
not there would be a negative the remedy would still be the same, “after all, if a State does 
not obey the law of the new System, must not force be resorted to as the only ultimate 
remedy, in this as in any other system.”53 Although the measure was rejected for reasons both 
practical and philosophical the episode illuminated the challenges faced in delineating the 
coercive powers of the proposed Constitution.54 Madison displayed foresight in his concern 
that a resort to coercion would be difficult to enact and therefore preferable to avoid, but in 
this case the consensus was that the universal remedy would be worse than localized disease. 
 Following the intensive discussions and negotiations to establish the principles of 
representation and the framework of the government, the debate over the specific enumerated 
powers of the Congress was less fractious.55 By making explicit in Article 1, section 8 the 
means by which the government of the United States could “Provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare” of the state and its citizens, the Framers displayed openly the 
provision for coercive power. The outcome of the internal debates within the convention, at 
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least so far as the extent of coercion as an adjunct of the new federal government was 
concerned, was to create the mechanisms for upholding the laws, not to create the means for 
deploying “coercion in its day-to-day administration of the laws.” As Max Edling rightly 
states, it did not “follow from the national government’s possession of the means of coercion 
that liberty was in danger.”56 
 
Once released for ratification by the people the Constitution was urged by its supporters as 
the means to safeguard the liberty won by Revolution. Unsurprisingly, although still worthy 
of notice, the new framework was defended in the same language of the necessity of 
government that had been deployed in the establishment of the state constitution. The 
pseudonymous author A Native of Virginia argued that the “best frame of government is that 
which is most likely to prevent the greatest sum of evil.”57 Others, however, wrote or spoke 
in a manner which indicated that human nature was entirely dependent upon government for 
its security, “it being a fixed point that human nature cannot exist without the assistance of 
government.”58 Neither perspective was controversial in terms of political thought, but these 
positions reflected the trend adopted by advocates of the Constitution to explicitly link the 
preservation of liberty with the carefully developed framework of government. As Alexander 
Hamilton made clear in the first number of the Federalist Papers, “the vigor of government is 
essential to the security of liberty.”59 
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The opportunity offered to the American people by the ratification process was 
earnestly regarded as an unprecedented chance to deliberately and voluntarily enter into a 
social contract. What before had been lost in the mists of time, or was traceable to conquest 
and civil tumult, was now to be deliberated upon reverently, discreetly, advisedly, and 
soberly. Edmund Pendleton made much of this in his speech to the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention on 5 June 1788. The peace and freedom presently pertaining in Virginia was 
propitious for considering “our real happiness and security.” Whereas government 
established by tyrants initiated a sustained war between despot and people, the opposite was 
now the case: “this is the only Government founded in real compact. There is no quarrel 
between Government and liberty; the former is the shield and protector of the latter. The war 
is between Government and licentiousness, faction, turbulence, and other violations of the 
rules of society; to preserve liberty.”60 Furthermore, Pendleton rejected the notion that the 
new frame of government should be a source of alarm; the remedy for faults was established 
within it, and in extremis the people could recall their consent. The propriety of such a 
remedy could not be gainsaid in a republic born of revolution, yet Pendleton did not wish to 
end on such a point. In a caveat reminiscent of David Hume’s questioning of the rights of 
legitimate resistance, Pendleton concluded, “we ought to be extremely cautious not to be 
drawn into dispute with regular Government, by faction and turbulence, its natural 
enemies.”61 The penchant for rhetorical appeals to the authority of the canon of political 
philosophy was evidently designed to persuade or overawe sceptics, although two could play 
at that game. Yet the enthusiasm for the improvements in the “science of Government” were 
evidently helpful in allaying fears reconciling advocates of the Constitution to the concept of 
coercion, suitably understood.62 Beyond theory, there was also recourse to the lessons of 
history. 
Historical examples and their lessons peppered the arguments in both the 
Constitutional Convention and ratification debates. The cornucopia was drawn from the 
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Classical World, early modern Europe, and more recent events.63 There was one particular 
example, or set of examples, that was referenced to very similar purpose in different times 
and locations. In looking to historical example, rather than just principle, analogous cases of 
composite republican polities were relatively sparse, and consequently recycled; thus the 
litany of the problems and lessons from the Ancient Greece in the form of the Achaean 
League, the Amphictyonic League, and early modern Europe in the form of the Swiss 
Cantons and the Dutch Republic. Madison had investigated these different confederations 
during the course of 1786; his careful notes identifying key features, and listing both their 
attributes of “feoderal authority” and vices.64 In his review of the Classical and early modern 
examples he frequently noted a lack of central authority and force, but did not explicitly refer 
to the concept of coercion. There was recourse to these Classical examples in the Convention 
itself, although early passing mention (by James Wilson) was merely to suggest that states 
would not be subsumed by a general government.65 A fuller elucidation (or at least, 
recording) of the example coincided with discussion of coercion, this time by Alexander 
Hamilton.66 
By the time Madison came to write publicly - if anonymously - in defence of the 
Constitution as Publius in Federalist XVIII, the term coercion was applied without hesitation: 
“The Amphictyons … had a declared authority to use coercion against refractory cities, and 
were bound by oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions.”67 The failure of this 
confederacy, attributable to the ineffectual way the theory was maintained, combined with the 
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many other examples of failed confederacies of history - to Publius the lessons were clear. A 
much more explicit appeal to these specific historical examples to condemn the Articles of 
Confederation was made by Oliver Ellsworth in the Connecticut Convention, 4 January 1788. 
His assessment, although one widely shared in the Philadelphia Convention and beyond, was 
blunt: “a more energetic system is necessary. The present is merely advisory. It has no 
coercive power. Without this, government is ineffectual, or rather is no government at all.” 
To support this assertion, Ellsworth then listed, in order, the example of the Amphictyonic 
Council, the Achaean League, the German lands within the Holy Roman Empire (although 
this is not explicit), the Swiss Cantons, and the Dutch Republic.68 This recitation followed 
remarkably closely to Madison’s outline in the Federalist. 
The creation and implementation of the federal government was occasioned by a 
range of conceptual shifts that rendered many of the acute fears of the Revolution much more 
palatable. The rhetorical strategies which defended the necessity of government and 
legitimised the transfer of sovereignty from the people to the state also served to redeem the 
concept of coercion. It was not merely that advocates of the Constitution moved from using 
the term privately to publicly, it was that their enthusiasm for doing so was not challenged on 
principle by their opponents. Perhaps this reflected a strategy of attacking the mechanisms of 
the Constitution rather than tilting at its theoretical foundations, but if so it still suggests a 
more general acceptance that coercion was a legitimate function, indeed the function, of the 
state. Patrick Henry, who maintained a most dogged resistance to the proposed Constitution 
on the basis of its threat to liberty, condemned the “arbitrary and tyrannical coercion” which 
precipitated the Revolution; but it was the abuse of power that was condemned.69 The 
acceptance that government implied coercion and was therefore legitimate was conceded by 
Antifederalist William Grayson, “I admit that coercion is necessary in every Government in 
some degree, that it is manifestly wanting in our present Government, and that the want of it 
has ruined many nations.” But the sticking point remained the issue of implementation, “but I 
should be glad to know what great degree of coercion is in this Constitution, more than in the 
old Government, if the States will refuse to comply with requisitions, and they can only be 
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compelled by means of an army?”70 Grayson’s rhetoric was a deliberate attempt to conflate 
the unworkable and rejected system of requisition with the Constitution’s empowerment over 
the individual citizen; and as events were to prove, the coercive power of the federal 
government was mobilized against those who refused to comply. With the ratification of the 
Constitution, the debates over the place of coercion in the state turned from theory to practice 
in the ambitions of the first Federalist administration.  
 
In a debate in the House of Representatives on the subject of public credit Richard Bland Lee 
argued that the newly established federal government was a “Government of the people, and 
nothing like a coercive principle was to be found in it.”71 Lee was both right and wrong in 
this assessment; his argument on the question taxation before the House was that the principle 
of government required persuasion of the people, not force, to be effective. In this he was 
correct, the republican form of government, both at the state and federal level, which had 
displaced the former colonial system was predicated on the principle of popular sovereignty. 
The Framers were sincere in their attachment to this theory, at least insofar as they had 
designed a framework of government that had sought to mitigate or soften the coercive 
realities of the state. And yet, Bland was also quite wrong. The emergence and evolution of 
the republican state through Revolution, convention, and ratification was a process in which 
the necessity of coercion in the state was gradually reconciled with the ideals of liberty and 
virtue that had launched the colonists toward independence. 
 That the language of coercion was adopted and utilized by Virginia’s and the nation’s 
founding elites in their ongoing efforts to refashion a successful republican state may seem 
axiomatic; as indeed it is. Yet the process of reconciling coercion with the spirit of the 
Revolution was by no means a straightforward one; and the development of partisan 
opposition to Federalist policy in the early republic testified that it remained a source of 
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friction. Significantly, the various debates, reforms, setbacks, and concessions through which 
coercion became palatable not only shaped the conceptualization of the state, but also created 
ramifications for the inhabitants denied the rights of citizenship. Francois Furstenberg, in his 
essay on the entanglement of chattel slavery and the revolutionary inheritance of liberty, 
rightly notes that “freedom and slavery thus became linked to virtue, understood as the will to 
resist tyranny.”72 The inseparable nature of resistance, virtue, and liberty was integral to the 
character of the revolutionary state that emerged from the tumults of war and the more 
deliberative structure of constitutional convention and ratification. It was the creed of both 
the people and the political elite. However, in building the republican state, established upon 
the sovereignty of the people, the role of resistance was retained as a rhetorical framework 
rather than as a practical mode of political action. Such a transformation was by no means 
uncontested, but the remarkable feature of debate over the character of the state was the 
manner in which the coercive authority inherent in the state was rehabilitated by the 
measured, yet insistent, tones of historical precedent and philosophical justification. In 
seeking ways to disperse, compartmentalize, mitigate, and restrict the coercive character of 
the republican state, the Framers and their allies ensured that the coercive apparatus that they 
had inherited from Britain was suitably reconciled to the aspirations of the great experiment 
in republican liberty. 
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